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Abstract 
 
Most attempts to argue for the second law of thermodynamics fail because (1) they use 
the unviable frequency theory of probability and (2) they do not explain why the arrow of 
time seen in experiments is aligned with the thermodynamic arrow of time. I use the 
decision theoretic interpretation of quantum probability from the many worlds 
interpretation of quantum mechanics to solve the probability problem. I then derive a 
correlation between the knowledge arrow of time and the entropy arrow of time using 
physical constraints on knowledge creation imposed by Popper’s evolutionary theory of 
knowledge and the many worlds interpretation. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In this paper I shall argue that in the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics 
(henceforth the many worlds theory) (Everett [1957], Deutsch [1997, 2002]) the growth 
of entropy is correlated with the growth of knowledge (that is, useful or explanatory 
information). Since the psychological arrow of time is associated with the growth of 
knowledge this argument proves a version of the second law of thermodyamics – we will 
see entropy grow in all experiments if we account for all of the entropy created in the 
experiment. 
 
In Section 2 I explain why previous attempts to prove the second law have failed. The 
arguments all assume the frequency interpretation of probability – probability is the 
relative frequency over an infinite set of trials. Since they all assume this interpretation of 
probability they do not explain what happens in any real experiment because all real 
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experiments consist of a finite set of trials. These arguments also do not explain why any 
purported asymmetry should match the psychological arrow of time, which means they 
do not explain the results that we see in experiments. 
 
Section 3 is about the arrow of time associated with the growth of knowledge. 
Knowledge has to be instantiated in some system that accurately reflects some of the 
causal and structural properties of some system in the past but the system simulated by 
the knowledge bearing system did not contain information about the knowledge bearing 
system. Karl Popper [1979] showed that knowledge grows as a result of evolutionary 
processes – processes that involve generating variations on existing knowledge and then 
selecting among those variations. As such knowledge must be instantiated in some 
system that can interact with the outside world without being changed because otherwise 
it cannot survive selection pressure even in principle and this places limits on the physical 
properties of knowledge bearing systems. 
 
In Section 4 I argue that quantum physics places constraints on the sort of information 
that can be copied – it must be instantiated in a property of a physical system that can be 
represented by a sum of orthogonal projectors. 
 
In Section 5 I explain that the decision theoretic theory of probability in the many worlds 
theory avoids the problems of the frequency theory of probability. According to the many 
worlds theory the universe we see around us is only part of a much larger structure called 
the multiverse which consists, in part, of many physical systems that act approximately 
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like the universe as described by classical physics. Using restrictions that the many 
worlds theory imposes on the flow of information in the multiverse it can be shown that 
the expectation value Aˆ  of an observable Aˆ  in the relative state ρ  is given by the Born 
rule 
 Aˆ = tr ρAˆ( ) (1) 
where tr •( )  is the trace function. 
 
In Section 6 I argue that the growth of knowledge is correlated with the growth of 
entropy when the restrictions on information copying imposed by quantum physics are 
taken into account. 
 
2 Previous Attempts to Prove the Second Law 
 
Most attempts to prove the second law of thermodynamics hang on arguments the 
ergodic theorem. This argument is well known so I will rehearse it only briefly to 
highlight the problems I consider relevant, for a critical survey of these arguments, see 
Earman and Redei [1996]. 
 
For any system of interest we typically cannot get access to all of the details of the 
system. For example, we can only measure the rough position of a cloud of gas, not the 
exact position of all of its constituent molecules. We also cannot measure the energies of 
all of the individual molecules only the average energy of some large number of 
molecules. The gross features of a system that we can measure are called the macrostate. 
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The fine-grained features that we cannot measure are called the microstate. For any given 
macrostate M A  there are many microstates mAa  that would produce the features of that 
macrostate where A  and a  are indices that label the states. 
 
Then it is argued that there is some measure μAa  over the set of microstates that gives the 
probability that if we see a macrostate M A  the system has the microstate mAa . The 
probability is defined as the relative frequency of the microstate in question over an 
infinite amount of time or an infinite number of trials. In classical physics a suitable 
system will evolve so that the current microstate mAa  determines the future microstate 
mft Aa( )  where ft •( ) is some time dependent function over the set of indices. The 
argument then runs along the lines that a given system will probably evolve so that 
μ ft Aa( ) > μAa  and the states which have higher probability according to the measure also 
have higher entropy where the entropy is some function of the measure and so is also a 
function of the probability. And so entropy will increase with time, thus proving the 
second law, or so the theory goes. 
 
There are at least two problems with this argument. First, we do not measure any system 
for an infinite amount of time or over an infinite number of trials. So predictions of the 
relative frequency over an infinite amount of time or an infinite number of trials are 
irrelevant to any real experiment. Second, even if this problem did not cripple the 
argument we would have no explanation as to why the direction in time in which the 
parameter t  increases is also the direction that we happen to see when we do 
experiments. I solve the first problem by using the decision theoretic interpretation of 
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probability in the many worlds theory. I solve the second problem by looking at the 
growth of knowledge as a physical process and showing that this process increases 
entropy. 
 
3 The Knowledge Arrow of Time 
 
Any piece of knowledge has to be instantiated in some physical object, e.g. – a human 
brain, a hard disc on a computer or the genes of an animal. If one physical system S1  
contains knowledge about another system S2  then S1  must contain a (possibly 
incomplete) description of S2 . In addition since some physical process generated this 
knowledge there must be a system that contains information about the knowledge 
creation processes: S3 . So S1  and S3  contain information about S2  but not vice versa. So 
it seems reasonable to say that there is an arrow of time connected to the growth of 
knowledge. Before knowledge is created about S2  there are no systems other than S2  that 
contain knowledge about S2  and afterward there are systems other than S2  that contain 
information about S2 . So the time at which S1  and S3  contain information about S2  is 
later than the time at which they do not contain information about S2  according to the 
knowledge arrow of time. For example, a bird’s wing and its genes contain information 
about the laws of aerodynamics but before wings evolved the air did not contain 
information about bird wings or genes. In this paper I argue that in the many worlds 
theory if there is a knowledge arrow of time of the kind described in this paragraph then 
the thermodynamic arrow of time is aligned with it. 
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Systems sometimes instantiate knowledge about things that are not physical objects, like 
prime numbers, so is it not true that some knowledge cannot be interpreted as information 
about a physical system instantiated in some other physical system? I shall argue that this 
can be reconciled with the knowledge arrow of time using mathematical knowledge as an 
example. Mathematical knowledge must be created by proposing that the properties of 
some physical object, like a mathematician’s brain or a computer programme, are similar 
in some respects to the properties of the mathematical objects invoked in the proof. So a 
given piece of mathematical knowledge can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can be 
interpreted as knowledge of some mathematical objects. Second, it can be interpreted as 
knowledge about the physical properties of the objects that supposedly mirror the 
properties of the mathematical objects we are interested in and so the knowledge arrow of 
time described above applies in this case too. 
 
Charles H. Bennett [1994] invented a measure of the knowledge in a physical object in 
terms of the number of steps that a Turing machine would have to take to describe that 
object – logical depth. (Strictly speaking the logical depth is actually the harmonic mean 
of the number of steps required by all of the different types of Turing machines.) Deutsch 
[1985] and Neilsen [2006] generalised the classical logical depth for the quantum theory 
of computation. In the quantum theory of computation a quantum computer can simulate 
any quantum system to any desired level of accuracy and so in quantum physics all 
systems can be considered as being the output of a quantum computation and so the idea 
of quantum logical depth can be applied to all quantum systems, which means that if the 
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many worlds theory is correct all physical systems have some quantum logical depth. So 
in the many worlds theory knowledge in the sense I have described in this Section is an 
attribute of physical objects and this provides a link between the knowledge and physics. 
Deutsch [1985] suggested proving the second law by showing that increasing quantum 
logical depth is correlated with the growth of entropy. I follow this suggestion by the 
indirect route of showing that the evolutionary processes that are required to generate 
knowledge increase entropy.  
 
Karl Popper [1979, Chapters 1 and 7] has shown that only processes that create variations 
on current knowledge and then select among those variations (evolutionary processes), 
can create knowledge. Human beings create knowledge by noticing problems with their 
current theories or habits, proposing changes to that knowledge to fix those problems 
(variation) and then criticising those proposals in the light of other knowledge (selection), 
which can include knowledge of results of observations. In biological evolution a 
mutation in an organism’s germ line cells can change the phenotypes of its descendants 
(variation). Some of those new phenotypes can make the organism carrying it better at 
propagating its genes than its competitors and so the genotypes that lead to those 
phenotypes become more common than their competitors (selection). Just to be clear, 
although Popper’s epistemology is often thought of as applying only to the growth of 
scientific knowledge in fact it applies much more widely because the logic of the problem 
of how to gain information about the world that can serve a specific purpose does not 
change when we are not dealing with people who are deliberately trying to create new 
explanations, as Popper himself realised (Popper [1979, p. 261]): 
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All this may be expressed by saying that the growth of our knowledge is the 
result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called ‘natural selection’; 
that is, the natural selection of hypotheses: our knowledge consists, at every 
moment, of those hypotheses which have shown their comparative fitness by 
surviving so far in their struggle for existence; a competitive struggle which 
eliminates those hypotheses which are unfit. 
This interpretation may be applied to animal knowledge, pre-scientific 
knowledge, and to scientific knowledge…. 
This statement of the situation is meant to describe how knowledge really 
grows. It is not meant metaphorically… From the amoeba to Einstein, the 
growth of knowledge is always the same: we try to solve our problems, and to 
obtain, by a process of elimination, something approaching adequacy in our 
tentative solutions.  
 
According to Popper knowledge must be subjected to selection if it is going to grow and 
improve. This means it must be possible for knowledge to survive tests, which means it 
must be possible for a knowledge bearing system to remain unchanged after an 
interaction. So it must be possible to copy the information in a knowledge bearing system 
without destroying it. This argument links the growth of knowledge to the physical 
process of copying information and so it links the knowledge arrow of time to 
information copying physical processes. I shall argue that it also links the second law of 
thermodynamics to the growth of knowledge. 
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4 The Quantum Physics of Copying 
 
In this section I shall give an argument showing that in the Heisenberg picture the only 
physical features of a quantum system that can be copied are features associated with 
sums of orthogonal sets of projectors. This argument is similar to restrictions derived by 
Zurek [2007] showing that only information represented by orthogonal vectors in Hilbert 
space can be copied due to the linearity of quantum mechanics. It is also related to the no-
cloning theorem (Wootters and Zurek, [1982]) which showed that no quantum 
mechanical process can copy an arbitrary quantum state due to linearity – if a physical 
process copies eigenstates of an observable Aˆ  it will not copy eigenstates of an 
observable Bˆ  that does not commute with Aˆ . In the Heisenberg picture a quantum 
system is described by a stationary state ρ  and evolving observables, which are both 
represented by Hermitian operators Aˆ t( ). The observables evolve unitarily: 
 Aˆ t2( )= Ut2 ,t1† Aˆ t2( )Ut2 ,t1 , (2) 
where 
 Ut2 ,t1
† Ut2 ,t1 = 1ˆ  (3) 
and 1ˆ  is the unit observable. 
 
Instead of observables we can use any operator that spans the vector space of the 
observables may describe a system and to avoid pre-judging the issue of what 
information can be copied I will use a different set of operators. Consider two systems S1  
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and S2  represented by operators on Hilbert spaces H1  and H2  respectively.  H1  and  H2  
can be spanned by operators Sab1 t( )  and Sef 2 t( ) with the algebra 
 
SAab1 t( )SAcd1 t( )= δbcSAad1 t( )
SAef 2 t( )SAgh2 t( )= δ fgSAeh2 t( )
SAab1 t( ),SAef 2 t( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 0
SAaa1 t( )
a
∑ = 1ˆ
SAee2 t( )
e
∑ = 1ˆ
, (4) 
where the indices on the SAab1 t( ) are integers in 1K N1  and the indices on the SAef 2 t( ) are 
integers in  1K N2 . The SAaa1 t( ) are orthogonal projectors PˆAa1 t( ) and so they are the 
projectors of some observable Aˆ1 t( )= αa1PˆAa1 t( )
a
∑  of S1  and the SAee2 t( ) are orthogonal 
projectors PˆAe2 t( ) and so they are the projectors of some observable 
Aˆ2 t( )= αe2PˆAe2 t( )
e
∑  of S2 . The SAab1 t( ) can be written as linear combinations of 
observables with complex coefficients so they too change unitarily. 
 
Any operator B1 t( ) describing some physical characteristic S1  can be written as 
 B1 t( )= βabSAab1 t( )
ab
∑ , (5) 
where the βab  are complex c-numbers. B1 t( ) changes unitarily just as the SAab1 t( ) do. 
If B1 t( ) is copied the copying process leaves B1 t( ) the same. So if the copying takes 
place between t1  and t2  there is some unitary operator Ut2 ,t1  such that 
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B1 t2( )= βabSAab1 t2( )
ab
∑
= Ut2 ,t1
† B1 t1( )Ut2 ,t1 = B1 t1( )= βabSAab1 t1( )
ab
∑ . (6) 
 
So if the βab  are different from one another I will say that B1 t( ) is non-degenerate. The 
copying process leaves a non-degenerate B1 t( ) the same if 
 Ut2 ,t1
† SAab1 t1( )Ut2 ,t1 = SAab1 t1( ). (7) 
If the βab  are not all distinct I will say that B1 t( ) is degenerate and the copying process 
leaves B1 t( ) the same if 
 Ut2 ,t1
† SAab1 t1( )Ut2 ,t1 = SAcd1 t1( ) (8) 
where βab = βcd . 
 
I will consider the case where B1 t( ) is non-degenerate first. Any unitary operator Ut2 ,t1  
may be written as 
 Ut2 ,t1 = γ cdef SAce1 t1( )SAdf 2 t1( )
cdef
∑  (9) 
where it can be shown using (3) that the γ cdef  are complex numbers such that  
 γ abcdγ efcd∗
cd
∑ = δaeδbf . (10) 
(4), (7) and (9) give 
 Ut2 ,t1
† SAab1 t1( )Ut2 ,t1 = γ cdafγ ghbf∗ SAcg1 t1( )SAdh2 t1( )
cdfgh
∑ = SAab1 t1( ). (11) 
From (11) c = a  and g = b  which implies that 
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 Ut2 ,t1 = PˆAc1 t1( )uc2
cd
∑ , (12) 
where the uc2  are unitary operators acting on H2 . (12) gives 
 Ut2 ,t1
† SAab1 t1( )Ut2 ,t1 = SAab1 t1( )ua2† ub2 , (13) 
so either ua2 = ub2  or a = b . In the former case Ut2 ,t1  factorises and so does not describe 
an interaction between the two systems and so obviously does not represent copying. In 
the latter case B1 t( ) is a linear combination of members of an orthogonal set of 
projectors with complex coefficients. 
 
What if B1 t( ) is degenerate? In this case 
 Ut2 ,t1 = PˆAc1 t1( )uc2
cd
∑ uπ1 , (14) 
where  
 uπ1 = SAπ e de( )de t1( )
de ∈De
∑
e
∏ , (15) 
 D1, D2 K  are sets of indices that can be swapped without changing B1 t( ) and  π1,π 2 K  
are permutation functions on  D1, D2 K  respectively. So degeneracy does not affect the 
argument that B1 t( ) is a linear combination of an orthogonal set of projectors with 
complex coefficients. Any information that can be copied must be instantiated in a 
physical quantity represented by an operator that is a linear combination of orthogonal 
projectors with complex coefficients. This is a non-trivial restriction, which some 
physical attributes of a system will not satisfy. For example, all quantities represented by 
an operator SAab1 t( ) with a ≠ b  does not satisfy this restriction. Observables are usually 
assumed to be Hermitian operators, that is linear combinations of orthogonal projectors 
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with real coefficients. Since this will not affect the substance of the argument I will give I 
will use Hermitian operators to represent information carrying physical quantities for the 
rest of this paper.   
 
5 Decision Theoretic Probability in the Many Worlds Theory 
 
If the many worlds theory is true then it is often the case that a measurement will have 
more than one outcome. Deutsch [1999], Wallace [2003], Zurek [2005] and Forrester 
[2007] have given arguments that can be interpreted as saying that the many worlds 
theory can incorporate probability as a weight that is attached to each branch by a rational 
decision theoretic agent – an agent who assigns ‘values’ to different games in a way that 
satisfies the ‘rationality’ requirement, namely that for any two games G1  and G2  either 
the value of G1  is greater than that of G2 , or it is less than that of G2  or it is equal in 
value to G2 . If the value of G1  is greater than that of G2 , the agent will willingly give up 
an opportunity to experience G2  for an opportunity to experience G1  and if the ranking is 
reversed his preferences will reverse too. If their value is equal he will be indifferent 
between experiencing G1  and experiencing G2 . It can be shown that the only set of 
values that obeys the rationality rules is the Born rule. I will explain how this argument 
works leaving out some of the details following Forrester [2007]. 
 
First I will outline the sense in which the multiverse can be said to contain many 
universes and then I will explain measurement theory in the many worlds theory. In the 
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many worlds theory a universe is a structure within the multiverse that resembles the 
universe of classical physics. A system S1  has observables 
 
Aˆ1 t( )= αa1PˆAa1 t( )
a
∑
Cˆ1 t( )= χc1PˆCc1 t( )
c
∑  (16) 
where 
 PˆCc1 t( )= ηcde1SAde1 t( )
de
∑  (17) 
and the ηcde1  are complex c-numbers such that PˆCc1 t( )PˆCb1 t( )= δbcPˆCc1 t( ). 
 
Suppose that between times t1  and t2  S1  evolves so that 
 Ut1 ,t2 = SAπ b( )b t1( )
b
∑ , (18) 
where π •( ) is a function that permutes the integers 1K N1  then 
 
Aˆ1 t2( )= αa1PˆAπ a( )1 t1( )
a
∑
Cˆ1 t2( )= χc1ηcdeSAπ d( )π e( ) t1( )
c
∑ . (19) 
This evolution permutes the projectors of Aˆ1 t( ). A Turing machine that obeys classical 
physics, as defined by Turing [1936], permutes integers and so this evolution performs 
N1  classical computations (computations that could be performed on a classical Turing 
machine) on Aˆ1 t( ). By contrast, this evolution does not permute the projectors of an 
arbitrary observable Cˆ1 t( ) of S1  as illustrated by equation (19). So I will say that the 
computation on Aˆ1 t( ) contains N1  branches of the multiverse – that is, N1  structures that 
look classical to any observers within the branch. The evolution of Cˆ1 t( ) does not 
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constitute N1  branches. If a branch persists over a large region of space and time then I 
will say that it is a universe. There is no guarantee that the branch will persist because in 
principle the system might start evolving such that the evolution operator is not of the 
form (18). 
 
I shall now briefly discuss measurement. A second system S2  has observables 
 
Aˆ2 t( )= αa2PˆAa2 t( )
a
∑
Cˆ2 t( )= χc2PˆCc2 t( )
c
∑
PˆCc2 t( )= ηcde2SAde2 t( )
de
∑
 (20) 
where the c-numbers ηcde2  are  defined similarly to the c-numbers the ηcde1 . During a 
perfect measurement S1  and S2  evolve so that 
 Ut2 ,t1 = PˆAa1 t1( )SAba⊕N1 b t1( )
a,b
∑  (21) 
where a ⊕N1 b = a + b( )mod N1  and this gives 
 
Aˆ1 t2( )= αa1PˆAa1 t1( )
a
∑
Aˆ2 t2( )= αa2PˆAa1 t1( )PˆAa⊕N1 b2 t1( )
a,b
∑
Cˆ1 t2( )= χc1η1cadSAad1 t1( )SAa⊕N1 bd⊕N1 b2 t1( )
abcd
∑
Cˆ2 t( )= χc2η1cbd PˆAa1 t1( )SAa⊕N1 bd⊕N1 b2 t1( )
c
∑
. (22) 
So the perfect measurement perfectly correlates Aˆ1 t( ) with Aˆ2 t( )  but does not perfectly 
correlate Aˆ1 t( ) with Cˆ2 t( ) or Cˆ1 t( ) with Cˆ2 t( ). So the measurement picks out Aˆ1 t( ) 
and Aˆ2 t( )  as preferred observables in which correlations are created between S1  and S2 . 
17 
 
In the many worlds theory a single branch can evolve each branch at the start of the 
evolution is associated with many branches at the end of the evolution. For example, if S1  
and S2  evolve as described in equations (21) and (22) above between t1  and t2  and then 
Aˆ1 t( ) evolves so that Aˆ1 t3( )= Cˆ1 t2( ) and Aˆ1 t( ) is perfectly measured onto Aˆ2 t( )  
between t3  and t4  then 
 
Ut4 ,t3 = PˆAa1 t3( )SAba⊕N1 b2 t3( )
a,b
∑
Aˆ2 t4( )= α2bPˆAa1 t3( )PˆAa⊕N1 b2 t3( )
ab
∑
= α2bηaea⊕N1 b2SAea⊕N1 b1 t1( )SAe⊕N1 da⊕N1 b⊕N1 c2 t1( )
abcde
∑
. (23) 
The measurement still produces a branching structure involving Aˆ1 t( ) and Aˆ2 t( ) . 
However, any particular branch at t1  is not associated with a single branch at t4  but with 
multiple branches. As such not all of the classical information that was recorded in Aˆ2 t( )  
before the measurement has been recovered from S2  and so it has not acted as a stable 
channel for classical information. The fact that many quantum systems do act as stable 
channels for classical information is explained by the theory of decoherence, see Ollivier 
et al. [2004, 2005] and Zurek [1991]. 
 
The evolution of the observables by itself is not enough to make predictions about the 
results of experiments. An observer can experience only one of the universes and so to 
make predictions he must know what universe he is in and what observables are sharp in 
that universe – this information is contained in the relative Heisenberg state ρ  a 
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Hermitian operator with unit trace. All of the information that an observer can access 
about an observable Aˆ t( ) is contained in the product ρAˆ t( ). 
 
Using the restrictions that the measuring process places on what information can be 
copied from one system to another it can be shown that a quantum game consists of (1) 
an observable Aˆ t( ), (2) a relative state ρ  and (3) a payoff function P  that maps each of 
the eigenvalues of Aˆ t( ) to the payoff the agent gets from experiencing that eigenvalue 
and that the game whose payoff function does not change the eigenvalues assigns 
expectation values to observables according to the Born rule (1). This argument provides 
a non-frequency theoretic theory of probability. 
 
6 Knowledge and Entropy in Quantum Mechanics 
 
6.1 The state of a knowledge bearing system 
 
The Schrödinger picture gives the same expectation values for observables as the 
Heisenberg picture and makes calculations somewhat easier although it is worse at 
tracking the flow of information (Deutsch and Hayden [2000]). I have now derived the 
constraints on the flow of information that I will need for my argument and so for ease of 
calculation from now on I will use the Schrödinger picture. The evolving global 
Schrödinger state ρ t( )  starts out equal to the static Heisenberg state at t = 0  and then 
evolves so that 
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 ρ t2( )= Ut2 ,t1 ρ t1( )Ut2 ,t1† . (24) 
In the Schrödinger picture the observables are static and are equal to the corresponding 
evolving Heisenberg observables at t = 0 . At a given time t0  the expectation values of 
measurements on a subsystem S  can be calculated by taking the reduced state ρS t0( ) of 
S  given by 
 ρS t0( )= trnot S ρ t0( )( ) (25) 
where trnot S •( ) is the partial trace over all of the Hilbert spaces of systems other than S . 
In general the reduced state evolves so that 
 ρS t2( )= trnot S Ut2 ,t1 ρ t1( )Ut2 ,t1†( ). (26) 
 
In Section 3 I argued that knowledge has to be information that can be copied. In Section 
4 I showed that information that can be copied is instantiated in physical quantities that 
are represented by Hermitian operators – linear combinations of orthogonal projectors. 
Now consider a quantum system S  with two subsystems S1  and S2  in the state 
 ρ t1( )= pab φab 12 12 φab
ab
∑  (27) 
where 
 φab 12 12 φab = λabcdλabef c 1 1 e d 2 2 f
cdef
∑ , (28) 
with c 1 1 e g 1 1 h = δeg c 1 1 h , d 2 2 f g 2 2 h = δ fg d 2 2 h  and the λabcd  are 
real numbers such that λabcd2
cd
∑ = 1. The λabcd can be assumed to be real because of the 
Schmidt decomposition. The reduced states of S1  and S2  are 
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ρ1 t1( )= pabλabcdλabed c 1 1 e
abcde
∑
ρ2 t1( )= pabλabcdλabcf d 2 2 f
abcdf
∑ . (29) 
If the observable with projectors φab 12 12 φab  is measured then the state of S  will 
remain unchanged. But if an observable with the same orthogonal projectors as ρ1 t1( ) is 
measured or an observable with the same orthogonal projectors as ρ2 t1( ) is measured or 
they are both measured then the state of S  changes unless φab 12 12 φab  is a product of 
those projectors. So if φab 12 12 φab  is not a product of orthogonal projectors on the 
Hilbert spaces of S1  and S2  then S  cannot be treated as a knowledge bearing system 
along with S1  and S2  since S  changes under measurements of S1  and S2 . So any 
knowledge bearing system that has knowledge bearing subsystems must have a state of 
the form 
 ρ t1( )= pab a 1 1 a b 2 2 b
ab
∑ . (30) 
It is important to note that not all states of a bipartite system are of the form (30). For 
example, the two-qubit state  
 σ = 12 00 + 11( ) 00 + 11( ) (31) 
cannot be written in the form (30), i.e. – it cannot be written as a sum of unentangled pure 
states of the two qubits. A similar argument holds for knowledge bearing systems with 
more than two knowledge bearing subsystems. The state for a knowledge bearing system 
with n  subsystems would be 
 
 
ρ t1( )= pa1K an aj j j a j
j
∏
a1K an
∑ . (32) 
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Since knowledge arises from selecting among different variations on a piece of 
knowledge, a knowledge bearing system S  will often contain knowledge bearing 
subsystems where S  contains information about the variations being compared and the 
results of the comparison. 
 
6.2 Entropy and decision theoretic probabilities 
 
I shall now show that the entropy of a system S  is the difference between the maximal 
information carrying capacity of a physical system and its actual information carrying 
capacity if the only systems we are allowed to use other than S  are in pure states and are 
not entangled with S . This provides an interpretation of entropy in terms of decision 
theoretic probabilities. Suppose that there are three systems S1,S2  and S3  all described by 
operators on a Hilbert space of dimension N . I will show that if some system S1  has the 
state a 1 1 a  for some number a  in the sequence 1K N  then if system S2  is in the 
reduced Schrödinger state ρ2 t( ) and the agent using S2  as a channel knows that it is in 
this state, if information is transferred first to S2  and then to a system S3 , which is in a 
blank state 0 3 3 0 , the maximum amount of information that can be transferred is 
 Imax ρ2 t( )( )= log N − S ρ2 t( )( ), (33) 
where the logarithms are taken to base 2 here and throughout the paper and 
 S ρ2 t( )( )= −ρ2 t( )log ρ2 t( ). (34) 
 
At time t1  the state ρ2 t1( ) may be written as 
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 ρ2 t1( )= pb b 2 2 b
b
∑ . (35) 
The state of S1,S2  and S3  at t1  is 
 ρ t1( )= a 1 1 a pb b 2 2 b
b
∑ 0 3 3 0  (36) 
where the b 2 2 b  are orthogonal. To use S2  as a channel for copying information about 
a  the best that can be done is to do a perfect measurement of the observable with 
projectors c 1 1 c  and then a perfect measurement of the observable with projectors 
b 2 2 b  onto the observable with projectors d 3 3 d . When this sequence of 
measurements is complete at time t2  the state is 
 
ρ t2( )= a 1 1 a pb π a b( ) 2 2 π a b( )
b
∑ π a b( ) 3 3 π a b( )
= a 1 1 a pπa b( ) b 2 2 b
b
∑ b 3 3 b . (37) 
where the functions π a •( ) are permutations of 1K N  a different function for each 
possible value of a . So the reduced state of S3  is 
 ρ3 t2( )= pπa b( ) b 3 3 b
b
∑ . (38) 
The maximal amount of information an observer could have about S2  before it was used 
as a channel is the expectation values of its observables. And the maximal amount of 
information that can be read out is gained by permuting the probabilities so the maximal 
amount of information that S2  can carry is a function of the numbers pb . 
 
Suppose that S2  has two subsystems S21  and S22  such that 
 ρ2 t1( )= pb21 pc22 b 21 21 b c 22 22 c
bc
∑  (39) 
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Then observing the result b  in a measurement of S21  does not yield any information 
about what the result would be of a measurement on S22  so the information I  gained 
from getting both results is the sum of the information given by each result separately: 
 I pb21 pc22( )= I pb21( )+ I pc22( ). (40) 
There should not be large changes in the amount of information we get for small changes 
in the pb  so as a function of pb , I  must be continuous: 
 I pb( )∝ log pb . (41) 
 
The probability of getting the result b  and the associated information is pb  so 
 Imax ρ2 t( )( )∝ pb log pb
b
∑ . (42) 
When 
 ρ2 t1( )= b0 2 2 b0  (43) 
where b0  is some integer in the range 1K N , S2  can hold as many bits as can be held in 
an integer in the range  1K N , i.e. – log N  bits. When S2  has the state 
 ρ2 t1( )= 1N b 2 2 b
b
∑  (44) 
permuting the numbers pb  does not change the state and so no information can be 
conveyed in S2  alone. S2  could be part of a larger system carrying information but 
discussing this would bring in resources other than S2 . (42), (43) and (44) give 
 
Imax ρ2 t( )( )= log N + pb log pb
b
∑
= log N − S ρ2 t( )( )
. (45) 
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There has been a controversy over whether or not the von Neumann entropy corresponds 
to the thermodynamic entropy based on analyses of a thought experiment by von 
Neumann [1932] (see Shenker [1999], Henderson [2003] and Shenker and Hemmo, 
[2007]). In the Appendix to this paper I show that these arguments against the von 
Neumann entropy do not work. 
 
6.3 Evolutionary processes and the growth of entropy 
 
Now I shall show that evolutionary processes lead to the growth of entropy. The growth 
of knowledge starts with two or more variations on the same knowledge and the results of 
previous comparisons between then and so starts with a knowledge bearing system S  
with knowledge bearing subsystems. I shall show that selection between the different 
variations in the subsystems of S  increases the entropy of those subsystems. What if 
there are many different pieces of knowledge undergoing testing? A system containing 
many different pieces of knowledge has a state of the form (32) and any such state can be 
rewritten as a state of the form (30) so I can use a state of the form (30) without any 
significant loss of generality. So at the start of the selection process at t1  the state of S  is 
 ρ t1( )= pab a 1 1 a b 2 2 b
ab
∑ . (46) 
The reduced states of the subsystems at t1  are 
 
ρ1 t1( )= pab a 1 1 a
ab
∑
ρ2 t1( )= pab b 2 2 b
ab
∑ . (47) 
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The selection process is a computation involving both S1  and S2 . This computation must 
be arranged using current knowledge, which is bound to be imperfect. So even in the case 
of a classical, i.e. – decoherent, computation it will be impossible for epistemological 
reasons to arrange for the computation to leave S1  and S2  in a state of the form (46). A 
slightly more specific argument might help motivate this idea. Knowledge of the 
orthogonal projectors of the density matrix must be created by a process that produces 
conjectures about the state and then performing tests of those conjectures. However, 
those tests do not give perfect access to the expectation values of observables. If the same 
observables were measured every time in any particular universe they give access to the 
relative frequencies of different results. The larger the number of trials the more rational 
it will be (in the decision theoretic sense) to expect that the relative frequencies are close 
to the probabilities but the relative frequencies will not match the probabilities perfectly 
(see Forrester [2007, Section 4]). In reality the experiment is performed with imperfect 
knowledge from previous rounds of conjecture and criticism and so the tester’s 
knowledge of what observable he measures in any particular test will be imperfect and 
this introduces another source of error. So if the selection process takes place between t1  
and t2  the state at t2  is of the form 
 ρ t2( )= pab φab 12 12 φab
ab
∑  (48) 
where  
 φab 12 12 φab = λabcdλabef c 1 1 e d 2 2 f
cdef
∑ . (49) 
The reduced states of the subsystems at t2  are 
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ρ1 t2( )= pabλabcdλabed c 1 1 e
abcde
∑
ρ2 t2( )= pabλabcdλabcf d 2 2 f
abcdf
∑ . (50) 
The expectation values of observables of S1  are now correlated with those of S2  and they 
contain information about one another that they did not contain before the interaction and 
that is what constitutes t2  being later than t1  in this theory. This argument assumes that 
the knowledge bearing systems evolve unitarily which seem too restrictive an assumption 
but the whole world evolves unitarily in the many worlds theory and so we can always 
expand one of the knowledge bearing systems to include the rest of the universe and the 
whole system S  will then evolve unitarily. Let 
 νc 1 1 νc = ξcdξce d 1 1 e
de
∑  (51) 
where the ξcd  are real c-numbers such that ξcdξ fd
c
∑ = δcf , then the νc 1 1 νc  are an 
orthogonal set of projectors and 
 νc 1 1 νc a 1 1 a νc 1 1 νc = ξcdξceξca2 d 1 1 e
de
∑ . (52) 
Equations (51), (52) and (47) give 
 νc 1 1 νc ρ1 t1( )νc 1 1 νc
c
∑ = pabξcdξce d 1 1 e
abcde
∑ . (53) 
It is well known that (Nielsen and Chuang [2000, Theorem 11.9, p.515]): 
 S νc 1 1 νc ρ1 t1( )νc 1 1 νc
c
∑⎛⎝⎜ ⎞⎠⎟ ≥ S ρ1 t1( )( ). (54) 
Equation (50) is of the same form as (53) and so 
 S ρ1 t2( )( )≥ S ρ1 t1( )( ) (55) 
and by symmetry 
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 S ρ2 t2( )( )≥ S ρ2 t1( )( ). (56) 
After the computation has been performed the results have to be measured and this too 
will increase entropy by a similar argument. The only way to decrease the entropy 
increase in the knowledge bearing system would be for the interaction to be reversed, 
which would delete the acquired knowledge or to export the entropy to another system by 
performing a swap operation on another system with less entropy. But this would just 
mean that the entropy of some other system would increase and so it would not allow the 
evasion of the second law. So the growth of knowledge is correlated with the growth of 
entropy. 
 
7 Discussion 
 
The argument given for the second law of thermodynamics in this paper depends on the 
many worlds theory and Popper’s evolutionary theory of knowledge. The evolutionary 
theory of knowledge is important because it is a non-anthropomorphic and non-subjective 
theory of knowledge. This allows knowledge creation to be thought of as a physical 
process and so allows us to study its physical effects. It also specifies what sort of 
physical processes can generate knowledge – process that involve the production of 
variations on existing knowledge followed by selection among the competing variations. 
 
The many worlds theory is useful for understanding the growth of knowledge and 
entropy for many reasons. The many worlds theory implies that quantum mechanics is a 
universal physical theory, that is, it is in the many worlds theory quantum mechanics 
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applies to the whole universe. In the quantum theory of computation a universal quantum 
computer can simulate an physical system so if quantum mechanics applies to the whole 
universe any motion can be thought of as a computation and the final state of that motion 
can be thought of as the results of a computation. The many worlds theory also allows us 
to understand probability by studying limitations on the acquisition of information and so 
places limits on the ways in which a decision theoretic agent can place bets in order to 
win – he has to bet according to the Born rule. Nor do quantum probabilities hang on the 
frequency interpretation although the decision theoretic argument in the many worlds 
theory does explain why relative frequencies are relevant to experimental tests. 
 
Some might object that my argument does not take error correction into account but error 
correction only reduces errors so that they do not prevent quantum computation from 
being scalable it does not eliminate them, for a survey of error correction, see Nielsen and 
Chuang [2000, Chapter 10]. Another possible objection is that this argument only shows 
that the entropy of subsystems of the universe has to increase in order for the generation 
of knowledge to take place but the entropy of the whole multiverse remains constant. 
However, we cannot manipulate the whole multiverse and the argument I gave shows that 
the entropy of the systems we can manipulate increases when knowledge grows. So the 
second law as argued for in this paper is relevant to what we can do and the entropy of 
the whole multiverse is not. 
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Appendix Von Neumann Entropy and Thermodynamic Entropy 
 
There has been a controversy surrounding a thought experiment proposed by von 
Neumann [1932] to show that the von Neumann entropy is the quantum mechanical 
thermodynamic entropy. In the traditional pre-quantum version of the experiment an ideal 
gas starts at t = 0  in the left hand side of a box walled off by a partition. The partition is 
removed and it is so light that removing it does not involve doing any work. The gas 
expands into the right hand side of the box doing work and generating entropy N log2  
where units have been chosen so that k = ln2  where k  is Boltzmann’s constant. The gas 
is then compressed quasi-statically back to its former volume which reduces the entropy 
back to its value at the start of the experiment. Shenker [1999] and Shenker and Hemmo 
[2007] have argued that the von Neumann entropy does not change in this way and so it 
cannot be the thermodynamic entropy. 
 
The experiment starts at t = 0  with a box divided by a partition. In the left side of the box 
there are some particles and each particle acts as a carrier for a qubit. Since the 
thermodynamic entropy depends on the position of gas molecules I will make a case that 
the entropy of the gas position changes in the way one would expect the thermodynamc 
entropy to change. The jth qubit Qj  has been prepared in the state 0z j j 0z  – the 
projector of the Schrödinger picture observable  
 σ jz = 0z j j 0z − 1z j j 1z  (57) 
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with eigenvalue 1. Also involved in the experiment are two measuring devices. One of 
these, M xqj , measures the observable: 
 σ jx = 0x j j 0x − 1x j j 1x  (58) 
of the Qj  where 
 
0x j j 0x =
1
2 0z j j 0z + 0z j j 1z + 1z j j 0z + 1z j j 1z( )
1x j j 1x =
1
2 0z j j 0z − 0z j j 1z − 1z j j 0z + 1z j j 1z( )
0z j j 0z =
1
2 0x j j 0x + 0x j j 1x + 1x j j 0x + 1x j j 1x( )
1z j j 1z =
1
2 0x j j 0x − 0x j j 1x − 1x j j 0x + 1x j j 1x( )
. (59) 
The other measuring device M scj  measures which side of the box the carrier of the jth 
qubit is on. The state of the whole system: the qubits, the position of the molecules and 
the measuring devices is 
 
ρ 0( )= 0z j j 0z L cj cj L 0 Mxqj Mxqj 0 0 Mcj Mcj 0
=
1
2 0x j j 0x + 0x j j 1x + 1x j j 0x + 1x j j 1x( )L cj cj L 0 Mxqj Mxqj 0 0 Mcj Mcj 0 .(60) 
 
At this point the entropy of the carrier position is zero – the same as the thermodynamic 
entropy. Between t = 0  and t = 1, σ xj  is perfectly measured by M xqj  and the state 
changes to 
 ρ 1( )= 12
0x j j 0x 0 Mxqj Mxqj 0 + 0x j j 1x 0 Mxqj Mxqj 1 +
1x j j 0x 1 Mxqj Mxqj 0 + 1x j j 1x 1 Mxqj Mxqj 1
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟ L cj cj L 0 Mcj Mcj 0 .(61) 
The reduced states of Qj  and M xqj  are 
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ρQj 1( )= 12 0x j j 0x + 1x j j 1x( )
ρMqjx 1( )= 12 0 Mxqj Mxqj 0 + 1 Mxqj Mxqj 1( ). (62) 
 
Between t = 1 and t = 2  the σ xj  observable is measured onto the carrier position and so 
the state is 
 ρ 2( )= 12
0x j j 0x 0 Mxqj Mxqj 0 L cj cj L
+ 0x j j 1x 0 Mxqj Mxqj 1 L cj cj R
+ 1x j j 0x 1 Mxqj Mxqj 0 R cj cj L
+ 1x j j 1x 1 Mxqj Mxqj 1 R cj cj R
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
0 Mcj Mcj 0  (63) 
The reduced states of Qj  and M xqj  remain unchanged and the reduced state of the carrier 
becomes 
 ρcj 2( )= 12 L cj cj L + R cj cj R( ). (64) 
So its von Neumann entropy increases to log2 . The molecules do not interact and it is 
easy to show that their total von Neumann entropy is N log2 . At this point there are 
molecules on both sides of the container and the von Neumann entropy of the carrier 
position is the same as the thermodynamic entropy. 
 
To quasi-statically compress the gas it is necessary to measure what side of the container 
each molecule is on. Between t = 2  and t = 3  the position of each molecule is measured:  
 ρ 3( )= 12
0x j j 0x 0 Mxqj Mxqj 0 L cj cj L L Mcj Mcj L
+ 0x j j 1x 0 Mxqj Mxqj 1 L cj cj R L Mcj Mcj R
+ 1x j j 0x 1 Mxqj Mxqj 0 R cj cj L R Mcj Mcj L
+ 1x j j 1x 1 Mxqj Mxqj 1 R cj cj R L Mcj Mcj R
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟
. (65) 
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Then a unitary operation can be performed between t = 3  and t = 4  such that 
 ρ 4( )= 12 0z j j 0z L cj cj L
0 Mxqj Mxqj 0 L Mcj Mcj L + 0 Mxqj Mxqj 1 L Mcj Mcj R
+ 1 Mxqj Mxqj 0 R Mcj Mcj L + 1 Mxqj Mxqj 1 L Mcj Mcj R
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
.(66) 
The gas returns to its initial state and so has zero entropy. Each measuring device has 
entropy N log2 . So the von Neumann entropy of the position of the gas increases to 
N log2  as a result of expanding into the right hand side of the box and then the entropy 
falls back to its former value as it is compressed back into the left hand side of the 
container. So the entropy changes just as it would according to thermodynamics. So this 
specific argument against the von Neumann entropy as the thermodynamic entropy fails. 
 
References 
 
Bennett, C. H. [1994]: ‘Complexity in the universe’ in Halliwell, Perez-Mercader and 
Zurek, [1994], pp. 33-46. 
 
Deutsch, D. [1985]: ‘Quantum theory, the Church-Turing Principle and the universal 
quantum computer’ Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, A400, p. 97. 
 
Deutsch, D. [1997]: The Fabric of Reality, London: Allen Lane.  
 
Deutsch, D. [1999]: ‘Quantum theory of probability and decisions’, Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London, A455, p. 3129.  
 
33 
Deutsch, D. [2002]: ‘The structure of the multiverse’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of 
London, A458, p. 2911. 
 
Deutsch, D., and Hayden, P. [2000]: ‘Information flow in entangled quantum systems’, 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, A456, p. 1759 
 
Earman, J.  and Rédei, M. [1996]: ‘Why Ergodic Theory Does Not Explain the Success 
of Equilibrium Statistical Mechanics’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 47, 
p. 63. 
 
Everett, H. [1957]: ‘“Relative state” formulation of quantum mechanics’ Reviews of 
Modern Physics, 29, p. 454. 
 
Forrester, A. [2007]: ‘Decision theory and information propagation in quantum physics’, 
Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 38, p. 815. 
 
Halliwell, J. J., Perez-Mercader, J. and Zurek, W. H. [1994]: Physical Origins of Time 
Asymmetry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Henderson, L. [2003]: ‘The von Neumann entropy: A reply to Shenker’, British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54, p. 291. 
 
34 
Nielsen, M. A. [2006]: ‘Quantum information science as an approach to complex 
quantum systems’, Available as e-print from http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0208078. 
 
Nielsen, M. A., and Chuang, I. L. [2000]: Quantum computation and quantum 
information. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Ollivier, H., Poulin, D., & Zurek, W. H. [2004]: ‘Objective properties from subjective 
quantum states: Environment as a witness’, Physical Review Letters, 93, p. 220401.  
 
Ollivier, H., Poulin, D., & Zurek, W. H. [2005]: ‘Environment as a witness: Selective 
proliferation of information and emergence of objectivity in a quantum universe’, 
Physical Review A, 72, p. 042113.  
 
Popper, K. R. [1979]: Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach, 2nd ed., New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Shenker, O.R. (1999), “Is kTr ρ log ρ( ) the entropy in quantum mechanics?”, 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 50, p. 33. 
 
Shenker, O.R. and Hemmo, M. [2007]: ‘Von Neumann's Entropy Does Not Correspond 
to Thermodynamic Entropy’, Philosophy of Science, 73, p. 153. 
 
Turing, A.M. [1936]: ‘On computable numbers, with an application to the 
35 
Entscheidungsproblem’, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society Series 2, 442 
p. 230.  
 
Von Neumann, J. [1932]: Mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics, 
Eng. Trans. by R. T. Beyer 1955, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Wallace, D. [2003]: ‘Everettian rationality: Defending Deutsch’s approach to probability 
in the Everett interpretation’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 
34, p. 415.  
 
Wootters, W. K. and Zurek, W. H. [1982]: ‘A single quantum cannot be cloned’, Nature, 
299, p. 802. 
 
Zurek, W. H. [1991]: ‘Decoherence and the transition from quantum to classical’, Physics 
Today, 44, p. 36. 
 
Zurek, W.H. [2005]: ‘Probabilities from entanglement, Born’s rule pk = ψ k
2  from 
entanglement’, Physical Review A, 71, p. 052105.  
 
Zurek, W. H. [2007]: ‘Quantum origin of quantum jumps: Breaking of unitary symmetry 
induced by information transfer in the transition from quantum to classical’, Physical 
Review A, 76, p. 052110. 
